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Abstract 
The dichotomy between ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ in relation to memory is difficult to 
clearly sustain. The veridicality of memory is typically established by drawing on 
the local, normative procedures that operate in a given setting (e.g. legal, clinical, 
social). Since all procedures are strictly relative, all memories are technically 
either ‘relatively falsified’ or ‘relatively as-yet-unfalsified’. False Memory Studies 
claim to be able explain the production of false memories, but do not offer 
criterion to effectively differentiate populations of so-called ‘true’ and ‘false’ 
victims. The narrative of the discovery of the ‘false memories’ themselves is 
inconsistent and demonstrates a significant level of imagination inflation and 
suggestibility to dominant narratives in post-war Psychology. In attending to the 
setting-specificity of memory, researchers may wish to consider how their work 
impacts on the experience-ecologies to which they contribute 
Introduction 
A sixteen year-old young man is convicted of participating in the brutal rape and 
murder of woman, along with his uncle. His conviction relies, in part, on a 
confession he has made during the course of questioning by police investigators. 
He later recants on his confession. Filmed footage of the police interviews, 
conducted without the presence of a lawyer or family member, appear to show 
the investigators guiding and shaping a narrative for the young man. At times 
they provide crucial details that they ask him to confirm. Much of what he is 
taken to remember consists of agreeing with statements that are put to him. 
A twenty-eight year old woman writes an open letter to a national newspaper 
accusing her stepfather of sexually abusing her when she was a seven year-old 
child. This is not the first time she has made these allegations. They originally 
appeared in the context of the divorce between her stepmother and stepfather. 
No criminal charges were brought at the time. The letter followed the publicity 
around a professional award given to her stepfather, a well-known public figure. 
The woman seeks to make plain what she sees as a very different side to the man, 
which has, she claims, been deliberately and systematically ignored by his peers. 
A young man in his early twenties is shown a picture by a psychologist that 
shows him as a child taking part in a hot air balloon ride and asked what he can 
remember of the event. The photograph is a fake, which has been digitally 
constructed out of real photographs provided by the man’s parent. The man 
initially claims not to remember anything about that day. But under the 
structured guidance of the psychologist, they gradually assemble some details. 
Over a series of interviews, these details are carefully pulled together to form a 
narrative of an event that, to the best knowledge of both the man and his parent, 
did not actually occur. 
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What do these three vignettes have in common? What do they tell us about 
memory and the process of remembering? The first comes from the case of 
Brendan Dassey, featured in the documentary Making a Murderer, which focuses 
on the case against his uncle Steven Avery around the murder of Teresa Halbach. 
The second describes the allegations publicly made by Dylan Farrow about her 
stepfather Woody Allen. The third is taken from the description of an experiment 
conducted by Kimberley Wade and colleagues at Victoria University of 
Wellington (Wade, Garry, Read & Lindsay, 2002). Three very different sets of 
events, taking place at different times and places, and under vastly different 
circumstances. Yet all appear to suggest something about the complex and 
contested relationship between what is remembered and the nature or indeed 
the existence of the actual events themselves. They suggest the possibility of 
‘false memory’.  
Or at least, that is one interpretation. Here are some others. Each of these cases 
occurs when the person concerned interacts with some form of institutional 
practice (i.e. the judicial system, the media, university based research). What is 
remembered takes place following the person being confronted with evidence or 
propositions (i.e. accusations, solicitations, implicit suggestions) that they either 
do not entirely understand or which are outside of their control, due to their 
status as either a vulnerable adult, a self-identified ‘survivor’, or being 
confronted with scientific ‘expertise’. The power to manage and control the 
situation clearly lies with the institution and its representatives (i.e. 
investigators, reporters, experimenters) in a way that is tangible to the 
participants.  
Alternatively, another thread running through all the cases is the actual or 
suspected betrayal of the person by a close family member. In Brendan Dassey’s 
case, it is the suspected actions of his uncle that have led to him to be taken from 
school into the bewildering and threatening atmosphere of the criminal justice 
system. For Dylan Farrow, the central felt betrayal concerns her stepfather, 
which is then compounded, for her, by refusal of his peers – some of whom she 
knows personally – to take her allegations seriously. And although the stakes are 
somewhat different for the participants in Wade’s experiments, the alternatives 
before them are to either accept that their own memory is at fault or to confront 
the challenging and perplexing idea that their parent would collude with an 
hitherto unknown professional to create a situation where they would be 
potentially embarrassed or humiliated.  
Finally, what all of these cases show us is the fraught relationship we all have to 
the past that we strive to remember. The central problem in the Steven Avery 
case is that the details of what actually happened in the murder of Teresa 
Halbach have become less rather than more clear in the course of huge efforts to 
secure and maintain a conviction. Brendan’s memories have been subject to 
repeated construction and deconstruction by the legal-investigative processes in 
which he is caught up, with the result that at the time of writing his conviction 
had been overturned Federal Court. Similarly, Dylan’s recollection has been the 
object of contestation through a whole series of subsequent events and public 
conflicts (e.g. her step-parents divorce and the ensuing publicity). Whilst Wade’s 
participants have not had to endure such dramatic circumstances, their pasts are 
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no less uncertain. Perhaps there really was a balloon ride that went 
undocumented and has been forgotten by the parents. Or perhaps entertaining 
uncertainty around this event threatens to corrode the memorial scaffolding on 
which their family relationships are built. 
Taking any of these three cases as exemplars for a clear dichotomy between 
‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ in memory seems rather problematic. The question we want 
to open up in this paper is what is actually accomplished through the use of the 
term ‘false memory’. How does this term enhance our understanding of the 
situated and contextual dynamics wherein the past is collaboratively invoked 
and put to work in the present. After all, as Elizabeth Loftus, one of the key 
contributors to the field has observed – ‘In essence, all memory is false to some 
degree’ (Bernstein & Loftus, 2009, p.373). Our argument is that rather than 
bringing us closer to the practices where recollections are offered and contested, 
the notion of false memory actually estranges and displaces the things we would 
want to understand. We call instead for an attention to the setting-specificity of 
remembering, where memory is approached as a property of jointly-managed 
activities that occur in a definite time and place, and which have their own 
distinct norms and procedures as to what constitutes ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ (see 
Brown & Reavey, 2015). Applying this approach to the psychology of memory 
itself allows us to reflexively question the complex relationship that 
psychologists have to the history of the discipline in which they are formed and 
located. 
Relatively Falsified Memories 
A good starting place is with the distinction between truth and falsity on which 
the conceptualization of ‘false memory’ stands. As commonsense, everyday 
terms, ‘true’ and ‘false’ are used a huge variety of ways. We can point to just a 
few of these to demonstrate. As technical terms, they mark whether a prior 
statement fits within what is taken to be the legitimate frame of reference (‘that 
is a false’). As rhetorical terms, they indicate the extent to which there is an 
alignment of opinion between speakers (‘what you say is true insofar as…’). As 
ethical terms, they indicate whether there is a proper moral continuity expressed 
in the actions of someone or something (‘a false prophet’). And as political terms 
they express a desire to unwind ideology from perception or debate (‘speaking 
truth to power). Clearly there are many other usages. 
Because of the inherent diversity and contradictions in usage, it is important to 
be clear on just what ‘false’ means in relation to memory. Presumably this falls 
somewhere within the technical domain. A false memory is one that deviates 
from the range of expected accounts of some given prior event. But this merely 
displaces the judgment, since it then requires us to properly state how these 
‘expected accounts’ were arrived at, what forms of evidence are deemed to be 
relevant and the procedures that were used to evaluate them. So whilst ‘truth’ 
and ‘false’ are the commonsense terms used in delivering this verdict, the 
judgment itself refers to a normative application of prior criterion and standards. 
Moreover, since access to the full range of historical data on which a given 
recollection is based may typically not be available (think again of whether or 
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not we are able to say definitively that a given event did or did not happen), then 
the normative judgment is tentative and provisional. 
This way of thinking about truth resonates with what the philosopher Martin 
Heidegger (2013) referred to as ‘correctness’. For example, the statement ‘this is 
true gold’ does not express anything of the essential nature of what gold is, but 
rather reflects a normative judgment based on whatever criterion are in play 
within the practice where the statement is uttered. ‘True gold’ for the merchant 
or the banker may be established by procedures such as weighing or markers of 
external verification (e.g. hallmarks), whereas ‘true gold’ for the chemist or 
physicist may require calculation of atomic mass and chemical testing. Referring 
to these matters as ‘correctness’ allows Heidegger to disentangle situated 
cultural-historical technical judgments from a broader sense of the truth. This, 
for Heidegger originates in the Greek term ‘aletheia’, which he translates as 
‘disclosure’ or ‘unconcealment’ and which refers to the temporal process by 
which things come into appearance in the world. This process implies both that 
there are aspects to the world that are not given at once, but are rather emergent, 
and that what is disclosed depends substantially on the situated nature of our 
engagements with events.  
This expanded version of truth has a projectful character that comes freighted 
with ethical commitments. It is our duty to follow truth as an always emergent, 
incomplete process where things are always differing from the ways in which we 
first encountered them. By contrast, the narrow technical version insists on a 
stability of identity and that things conform with the way we want them to be. It 
is the conflation of these two senses that allows those who would seek to impose 
their own technical procedures beyond the domain of their normative 
application to cloak themselves in the moral guise as ‘defenders of truth’, and 
conversely those who do not adhere to those procedures as ‘unreliable’ or ‘true 
believers’ (see Campbell, 2003). 
To avoid this, we would suggest replacing the terms ‘true’ and ‘false’ with those 
that are better fitted to the procedural and normative aspect of judging memory. 
Let us be clear that we are not arguing against the possibility of establishing 
whether a given recollection can be judged to be sufficiently accurate or not. 
Quite the reverse: this matter is so crucial that we need to overcome the 
unhelpful allusions that attach to notions of ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’. We propose that 
recollections that do not map onto normatively established criterion of 
correctness ought properly to be called ‘relatively falsified memories’, where the 
modifier relative refers to the situated nature of the judgment. Recollections that 
do pass this test are not, by default, ‘true’, since this implies the existence of a 
further set of unspecified procedures for complete verification. In the case of 
Wade’s experiments this would amount to something like a full forensic 
investigation of the complete life-history of the participants which was able to 
eliminate beyond any reasonable doubt that no balloon ride had ever been made. 
Instead ‘correct’ memories should be termed ‘as-yet-unfalsified memories’.  
But to arrive at these more refined categories would require further 
investigation into the actual procedures for partial verification that are used in a 
given setting. For example, Elizabeth Loftus’ well-known Lost in the Mall 
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experiment (see Loftus & Pickrell, 1995), developed the procedure later used by 
Wade et al of using information supplied by family members as the basis for 
facilitating ‘false memories’. In doing so, the experimenters essentially based 
their falsification procedure on trust in this initial information. It seems that at 
no point did they question the accuracy of the family member’s memories, 
despite the inherent mistrust of personal experience that permeates the 
approach. A crucial question is whether or not research of this kind is able to 
demonstrate that it is not vulnerable to precisely the kinds of external influences 
that it purports to study (see Motzkau 2009 on suggestibility research).  
A further issue is with the reasoning that underpins the division of true and false. 
In a summary of the state of the field in 2003, Loftus claims: 
Collectively, researchers have learned a great deal about how false 
memories develop and are almost at the point of being able to write a 
recipe. First, the individual gets convinced that the false event is plausible. 
Even events that start out being rather implausible can be made to seem 
more plausible by simple suggestion. Next, the individual gets convinced 
that the false event was personally experienced. Plying the person with 
false feedback is a particularly effectively way to accomplish this. At this 
point, the individual might merely believe that the event is true but have 
no sense of recollection. But with guided imagination, with visualization 
of the stories of others, and with suggestive feedback and other sorts of 
manipulation, a rich false memory can occur. (Loftus, 2003, p.871) 
This seems at first glance quite a promising model. Constructing plausibility 
creates the fertile field in which additional misinformation can take hold, which 
is then elaborated by adding visualization and suggested perceptual experiences 
resulted in the ultimate implantation of a ‘rich false memory’. However, the sorts 
of target ‘false memories’ which have been the longstanding object of the field, 
and indeed the source of the term ‘false memory’ in the first place, are those 
where adults remember extreme, traumatic experiences, typically of rape or 
sexual violence during childhood that are subsequently not verified through legal 
or other procedures (or may sometimes be retracted) (Campbell, 2003). It must 
be said that these kinds of cases are comparatively rare when set against the 
number of cases where some form of verification is possible, and the further ‘file 
drawer’ set of cases that are never brought because of concerns around the legal 
process. The Loftus model seeks to explain this small number of cases by 
beginning with a far broader general population and then probabilistically states 
how, from an initial condition, each step may lead to the formation of a false 
memory. 
The trouble with this kind of reasoning is that it overlooks the conditional 
probabilities that are involved. If one were really committed to understanding 
the difference between what Loftus (2003, p.871) calls ‘false victims’ and ‘true 
victims’, then properly speaking the approach ought to be ‘given the existence of 
an allegation of abuse, what factors distinguish the classes of ‘true’ and ‘false’?’ 
rather than ‘what factors lead probabilistically from initial conditions to the final 
outcome?’. The difference between these approaches is significant, in both a 
logical and a statistical sense. The approach taken in false memory research 
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starts with the general and tries to work its way down a quasi-causal pathway to 
the particular. Whereas beginning from actually occurring events, defining 
discrete populations around those events and looking to factors that distinguish 
those populations from one another eliminates much speculative reasoning.  
For example, in the previous citation, Loftus draws upon a mélange of ideas to 
build a conceptual bridge from the general to the particular, including the 
misinformation paradigm, imagination inflation, suggestibility research, guided 
imagery/vizualisation studies and more. But even this heavily over-egged 
theoretical recipe can’t quite reach its intended target because, crucially, at no 
point is it able to show the actual implantation of memories of childhood sexual 
abuse. These are probabilistically implied rather than demonstrated. So strictly 
speaking we must say that what is being studied is not the same thing as a ‘false 
memory of childhood abuse’. But if the research were to begin with the actual 
joint occurrence of allegations of abuse with either support or falsification, then 
meaningful questions as to whether, say, ‘imagination inflation’ distinguished the 
actual populations – and therefore had any explanatory value at all – could be 
posed. It is our suspicion that very little of what is in Loftus’ recipe would 
differentiate the populations, and that other factors such as history of 
engagement with social-welfare services, social and economic conditions or co-
presence of other forms of emotional abuse, might be better candidates.  
The Formation of False Memory Research 
So if false memory research does not actually demonstrate the implantation of 
‘false memories of child sexual abuse’, then what can we say about what it does 
show and the way it arrives at those demonstrations? As befitting someone who 
is now at the apex of their career, Loftus has published numerous overviews of 
the development of the field and the centrality of her role (e.g. Loftus, 2013; 
Loftus, 2000; Loftus & Ketcham, 1995). The narrative typically begins with her 
well-known work on eyewitness memory in the 1970s, which established 
experimentally the power of providing misinformation on subsequent recall of 
films of traffic accidents (see Loftus, 1979). This work occurs at a pivotal point in 
the recent history of psychology. It is the moment where the cognitive paradigm 
is beginning to achieve a degree of systematization, pulling together parts of 
information theory with systems theory, cybernetics and analytical philosophy.  
Dupuy (2000) has argued that the particular way in which cybernetics was 
mobilized was decisive. Analytical approaches from philosophy of mind became 
wedded to the approach, with the effect of erasing questions of reasons and 
meaning. Difficult philosophical notions such as intentionality became 
operationalized in a reductive manner as matters of feedback and information 
processing, following Weiner’s (1948) original proposed solution. The outcome 
is what Dupuy calls a ‘mechanization’ of the mind. 
Loftus’ work embraced this mechanization in the case of memory, since it holds 
out the possibility of not simply representing the processes putatively involved, 
but also of enabling intervention. A mechanized mind is also one that is malleable. 
The particular form of intervention that Loftus envisaged was in relation to the 
law. Her working assumption at the time appears to be that since the justice 
system requires confidence in the testimony provided by witnesses, it is the role 
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of the psychologist to demonstrate the conditions under which that confidence 
might be undermined through phenomenon such as suggestion, misinformation, 
distortion etc (see Loftus & Ketcham, 1992). This is a somewhat peculiar way of 
posing the problem – surely questions of justice are better formed in terms of 
recognizing how to elicit and recognize those things and persons who stand in 
need of reparation? That is, how to create rather than dissolve confidence in 
legal testimony. Loftus’ initial orientation to this problem makes clear why much 
of her work makes reference to the tradition of ‘skepticism’. However, what is 
missing here is an awareness that historically skepticism emerged out of a 
critique of existing authorities and power – it is a weapon of the weak that uses 
reason against brute force, not a further cudgel through which the powerful can 
further buttress themselves against potential claimants (see Stengers, 2000) 
The use of skepticism as a means of supporting rather than critiquing existing 
social and/or political arrangements certainly fits with how some dialects of 
psychology, particularly in the USA, have seen the role of the discipline post-
1945. Nevertheless, it is extraordinary to propose, as Loftus has done recently, 
that a legitimate application of false memory research would be to engage in the 
of implanting false memories in order to influence dietary choices as part of a 
social programme against the ‘obesity epidemic’ (Bernstein, Pernat and Loftus, 
2011). Even when her work has identified with a ‘vulnerable’ group, such as 
families accused of historical sexual abuse by adult children (e.g. members of the 
False Memory Syndrome Foundation), the strategy has been to support their 
efforts to dismiss the claims made against them by those who identify as victims 
rather than attempting to understand the material and psychological conditions 
under which a family might collapse into serious open conflict.  
Critics of the kind of experimental psychology of memory that Loftus has 
pioneered typically bemoan its obsession with accuracy rather than with the 
contexts in which remembering occurs (e.g. Middleton & Brown, 2005). But in 
actuality, accuracy is never really the concern in false memory research – the 
focus is on the impairment of accuracy, or the production of error. Because of 
this, there is little to be found in this work that assists in the project of improving 
confidence in memory, of supporting the vulnerable in making sense of what 
they remember. Arguably, the participants in a variant of the Lost in the Mall or 
the Fake Balloon Ride study don’t really learn anything that would help them in 
relation to their own autobiographical memories, other than not to trust either 
experimental psychologists or their own family members.  
One possibility here might be to see that many of the problems stem from what 
Dupuy (2000) calls the ‘unhappy accident’ where psychologists bought into the 
wrong combination of cybernetics and philosophy. Consider, for example, the 
kind of speculative theories of alcoholism and ‘schizophrenia’ that Gregory 
Bateson (1973) – one of the key figures in the Macy conferences which became 
the foundations of modern cognitive science – developed by taking an ‘open 
systems’ version of cybernetics rather than a ‘closed systems’. Here the unit of 
analysis is the family or the group rather than the individual, and the processes 
allow for both learning and a transformation of the functioning of the system 
itself. False memory research is blind to these open system properties. It 
assumes that individuals find themselves, for whatever reason, in some situation 
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where they are exposed to suggestive misinformation, which they then 
incorporate into their autobiographical memories. But very rarely do we simply 
‘arrive’ in some setting without a set of intentions or projects which are relevant 
to what we will do next. Moreover, the ‘implantation’ paradigm requires that the 
person actively participate in the practice and perform work on themselves. To 
do this requires a reflexive orientation to the sort of person one is and what one 
wants to become.  
It is the focus on the capacity for turning around on oneself, in concert with 
others, that is sorely lacking in false memory research. The following words of 
Bartlett have often been cited by those arguing for a reconstructive (rather than 
reproductive) conception of memory: 
In a world of constantly changing environment, literal recall is 
extraordinarily unimportant. (Bartlett, 1932, p.203-4) 
This is usually glossed as a claim for the relative lack of importance of accuracy 
in recall, in favour of a social orientation to remembering (e.g. Middleton & 
Brown, 2005). But the full passage in which these words appear prove far more 
instructive: 
An organism which possesses so many avenues of sensory response as 
man’s, and which lives in intimate social relationship with numberless 
other organisms of the same kind, must find some way in which it can 
break up this chronological order and rove more or less at will in any 
order over the events which have built up its present momentary 
‘schemata’. It must find a way of being dominantly determined, not by the 
immediately preceding reaction, or experience, but by some reaction or 
experience more remote … We must, then, consider what does actually 
happen more often than not when we say what we remember. The first 
notion to get rid of is that memory is primarily or literally reduplicative, 
or reproductive. In a world of constantly changing environment, literal 
recall is extraordinarily unimportant. (Bartlett, 1932, p.203-4) 
We take Bartlett to be arguing here that a reflexive orientation to what we can 
remember is a means of ‘breaking’ with the apparent ‘order’ of the present 
through using the past as a means of restructuring our relations to others and 
the broader environment. To put this in systems theory terms, memory enables a 
kind of learning that allows the system to overcome its own parameters and 
achieve a new state that is not simply predictable from the current state.  
The standard narrative in false memory research is that a person somehow finds 
himself or herself in therapy, where they are exposed to malicious practices that 
result in the implantation of ‘false memories of childhood sexual abuse’ leading 
them to accuse innocent family members. Yet the decision to enter therapy 
already indicates that this person has begun to turn around on their own life 
history and is seeking to find some way of ‘breaking up the chronological order’ 
to transform themselves. They do this crucially not as a wholly independent, 
autonomous agent (like a closed system lacking in meaning, intentions and 
history), but rather as a person embedded in a web of relations that together 
form an open system. In a small number of cases, clients do indeed claim to 
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remember forgotten episodes of abuse and confront family members. But the 
idea of memory ‘implantation’ is not only unlikely to differentiate this small 
subset from the broader population of clients who remember childhood sexual 
abuse, it also doesn’t really assist in understanding the particular, contingent 
life-histories that are implicated in cases of ‘relatively-falsified memories’. 
Studies of ‘recovered memory’ have shown that there are very few incidences of 
remembering such events with absolutely no existing memories or suspicions of 
some form of abuse prior to therapy (see Reavey & Warner, 2003). It is therefore 
not simply a question of switching from one form of belief (‘I am unhappy’) to 
another (‘I am a victim of child sexual abuse’) as a consequence of memory 
implantation or whatever else. To use the parallel example of Brendan Dassey, 
he seems to have been aware during the process of his conviction, that what he 
remembered in one setting (e.g. under police interrogation) was very different to 
what he remembered in other settings (e.g. talking to his mother). His problem 
then became that of managing the tensions and contradictions between the 
various accounts. That is to say, an ecological and relational problem grounded in 
the various settings in which his memories were being solicited and contested. 
We can now differentiate two different ways of thinking about the ‘falsity’ of 
memory. In the first, memory is property of a mechanised mind which processes 
information from the environment to arrive at states that we can call ‘beliefs’ 
that determine action. The capacity of this closed system to understand the 
relationship between information and belief states – i.e self-insight – is 
somewhat limited, hence it is malleable to external manipulation. In the second, 
memory is the property of an open system that strives to alter its relationship to 
the environment by reflexively turning around on its own prior states in order to 
free itself from being constrained by immediate demands and conditions. When 
a person recalls something, they do so as part of an open system such that what 
is remembered is, properly speaking, the collaborative product of the system 
rather than the output of an individual cognitive system. In the first mode of 
thought, falseness is a belief state that is externally unverifiable and which is 
arrived at through information distortion. In the second, falseness is a complex 
contingent process which emerges through a reflexive effort at transforming the 
existing state of the system and which serves as the means for ‘learning’ to occur. 
This differentiation of modes of thought can be usefully applied to the history of 
false memory research itself. Scientific research can be treated as the 
accumulation of more information, some of it ‘correct’, other parts ‘false’. The 
processing of this information results in states we can call ‘theories’ or 
‘paradigms’. At certain historical points, the limitations of the system to include 
specific kinds of environmental information, or to generate novelty, brings about 
a crisis in the form of a system re-boot or shift to a new paradigm. This is more 
or less the narrative that Loftus offers in her reviews – the successive gathering 
of more data, more conceptual pieces of the puzzle, until the ‘recipe’ for making 
false memories gradually emerges.  
But there are some significant gaps in this story. Things don't always add up. For 
one, there is the curious relationship that Loftus’ work has to Freudian 
psychoanalysis (the very exemplar of unscientific ‘true belief’ that false memory 
research rejects) (see Pope, 1995).  Throughout her work, Loftus has relied upon 
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neo-Freudian notions of repression and suggestion to explain how non-
conscious processes may be manipulated. Whilst these are usually translated 
into the argot of information theory, their roots to a very different tradition of 
practice and enquiry remain. Equally intriguing is the genesis of the term ‘false 
memory’ itself. As Pezdek & Lam (2007) have shown, the term gains some 
currency within the experimental psychological community in the 1990s. Whilst 
conceptually much of the work that emerges there is indebted to the 
longstanding tradition of suggestibility research (see Motzkau 2009), the idea of 
a thing called a ‘false memory’ owes more to the formation and activities of the 
False Memory Syndrome Foundation (FMSF) in 1992. It is this group that first 
defines the problem space of ‘falseness’ in memory in the contemporary sense of 
the term. It is then constituted as a social and a political category, aligned with a 
particular set of group interests, rather than as a ‘scientific’ category emerging 
from data, despite the here purely rhetorical use of the medical term ‘syndrome’. 
Loftus’ research in the 1990s then seeks to flesh out this socio-political category 
by speculatively mixing together data and concepts derived from the very 
different context and tradition of experimental psychology.  
The difference between this way of developing research and the ‘standard view’ 
of scientific enquiry (which forms the basis for Loftus’ own narrative) can be 
seen in the origins of both the Lost in the Mall and the Fake Balloon Ride 
experiments. The former apparently began its life as a thought experiment 
during a car journey before becoming a ‘party trick’, and was only actually 
performed under laboratory conditions quite late in its history (with very 
minimal data at that) (see Ashmore et al, 2005). The idea seems to be of greater 
importance here than the actual experiment. Whilst the Fake Balloon Ride 
experiment does offer a more substantive dataset, it too appears to be a thought 
experiment that was waiting for the right conditions to be demonstrated rather 
than provoked by need to make sense of an emergent empirical problem, based 
on the acknowledgement ‘we also thank … Jacquie Pickrell (for her work on a 
pilot version of this method several years ago when our ideas outpaced the 
available technology)’ (Wade et al, 2002, p.597). 
Things do not then really add up with the narrative of gradual accumulation of 
facts and concepts grounded in the careful sifting of data such that a clear 
explanatory category ‘false memory’ emerges. In fact, we would have to say that 
technically the idea of the discovery of ‘false memory’ cannot be verified by the 
available facts, but seems to be an imaginative elaboration of the events, which is 
to say, in the terms of the field, a ‘false memory’. What makes more sense is to 
treat the field as a complex trajectory of contingent relations between the social, 
political and the technical, that arrives at a very partial and contested description 
of the contextual dynamics of memory as part of a shifting alliance between 
various groups of interests.  
Memory in the Experience Ecology 
Our description of the contingent emergence of ‘false memory research’ is not 
intended as an in-principle or external critique. We do not seek to directly 
evaluate this field in comparison with some rival programme of memory studies. 
Our critique is rather with the internal logic of the approach and with the 
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application of its own standards to its particular history. If the claim is that there 
are things such as ‘true’ and ‘false’ memories in the world, which can be 
identified purely in terms of the putative psychological mechanisms that 
distinguish them, irrespective of the particular contexts in which they occur, 
then this cannot be verified by the available facts within the field. In this sense, 
‘false memory research’ is self-falsifying, it constitutes its own critique. 
However, if we look at the history of the field as a contingent and provisional set 
of relations, which temporarily align in different ways to make interesting, 
contestable and contested propositions, then this can also be mobilised as an 
approach to ‘false memory’. Imagine what might happen if at various points in 
the contingent history of the field, the opposite branching were taken. For 
example, rather than the closed systems approach, which leads to the 
mechanisation of mind, what if an open systems approach had been pursued. 
This would result in a concern with the fluidity of relations between system and 
environment, or out slightly differently, with the settings in which remembering 
occurs rather than the individual per se. Rather than treat therapy or police 
investigations as sites where ‘false memories’ are implanted, we would instead 
seek to understand the particular practices through which accounts of the past 
are collaboratively constructed (e.g. what sorts of actions, the kinds of social 
technologies in play, the particular use of evidence, forms of reasoning), along 
with the specific criterion used to establish ‘true’ from ‘false’. Crucially, we would 
also want to ask what functions and broader projects are being enacted within 
the setting, how it makes use of ‘memory’ as a means of ‘breaking with the 
chronological order’ by which it might otherwise be determined. 
At the same time, we might take the different tack of asking how, within a given 
setting, confidence is established in relation to memory. For instance, many 
institutional settings have a strong orientation to their own historicity, which 
they seek to enshrine and display in various ways, such as through explicit 
narratives, iconography and even material displays (e.g. corporate museums). 
Becoming involved with an institution means finding that one’s own biography is 
now intertwined with that historicity in ways that can become problematic. For 
example, when children enter into adoption processes, social welfare institutions 
effectively become the ‘guardians’ of their memories, which they address 
through practices such as life-story work (see Brown & Reavey, 2008). We would 
then want to ask how memory can be supported and facilitated in such settings 
rather than falsified. 
What this amounts to is an analysis of the setting-specificity of memory. True and 
false are not abstract criterion which can be applied following the application of 
a speculative reasoning to any given case. They are instead complex, contingent 
matters that only have any meaning within particular setting in which they can 
be established (see Brown & Reavey, 2015). We do not deny the importance of 
accuracy. In fact, contrary to the way that Bartlett’s infamous quote has 
sometimes been invoked, we would say that accuracy is usually fairly decisive in 
the vast majority of settings. But it is always a relative term. Verification and 
falsification are collaborative achievements of the settings as a whole, and are 
typically provisional and subject to contest, since they involve matters of power 
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and authority indexed to the specific projects and history of the setting (this is 
what all our opening three vignettes illustrate).  
From this perspective, if one wanted to examine, say, why allegations of 
childhood sexual abuse that were relatively verified in one setting (e.g. therapy) 
but were relatively falsified in another (e.g. courts of law), then a reasonable 
empirical approach would be to take the population of allegations that were both 
verified and falsified in both settings (i.e. not just those that were falsified, but 
also those that achieved relative verification across the settings) and attempt to 
identify the particular, contingent factors that differentiated the two groups. This 
approach would, of course, have very little to say about the ‘truthfulness’ or 
‘falseness’ of memory in general, but after all, if, as Loftus claims ‘all memory is 
false to some degree’, then such general claims can scarcely be of any great 
interest. 
It is the specific conditions under which falseness and truthfulness are 
established which form both the empirical object, and to some extent the ethical 
obligations of psychological research. As Loftus rightly observes, as professionals, 
it is our duty to take responsibility for the life of the concepts that we develop 
and the effects they may have in the broader world: 
mental health professionals and others must be aware of how greatly they 
can influence the recollection of events and of the urgent need for 
maintaining restraint in situations in which imagination is used as an aid 
in recovering presumably lost memories. (Loftus, 1997, p.75) 
Psychological research is not just about the world, is is also of the world. If we 
think of the ranges of culturally and historically situated ways of being that are 
available to persons at a given place and time as constituting something like an 
experience-ecology (see Brown, 2015), then we can see that as responsible 
professionals it is our role to ensure that our ideas do not, as far as possible, 
pollute that ecology or become so virulent as to crowd out and destroy the other 
forms of cognate experience which exist within that ecology. Experiences are 
contingent, fragile, tentative things that sit in a web of interdependencies. We 
must not breed monstrous concepts that devour all before and render the 
ecology a barren, lifeless place. 
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